Rousseau, in his 'Dialogue', records that he used to walk to Bercy, an hour away from his home, solely for the pleasure of hearing a nightingale. Words like 'environment' and 'amenity' and 'cost-benefit analysis' had not entered the vocabulary of politics in his day. Today it would not surprise me if some earnest student of welfare economics.quantified Rousseau's activity. The two hours spent walking every time he went to hear the nightingale were, after all, hours he might have spent writing, and so increasing his royalties; so a price tag could be attached to these visits. And by means of a suitably worded questionnaire the student could discover what percentage of the working population still walk to hear nightingales, the average distance they walk, the frequency of their visits, and what their incomes are; and the student could then write a thesis on 'The Utility Value of Nightingales'.
You may be beginning to think that this is a frivolous way to start a lecture to such a distinguished audience. So let me redeem myself. If you substitute Cublington for Bercy, and aircraft noise for nightingales, you get precisely the same logic of analysis; it is in the Roskill Commission's report on a third London airport. Cublington rather than Foulness was recommended largely on the strength of a cost-benefit analysis which estimated on the one hand that the disbenefit of amenity and noise level would be some £35 millions greater at Cublington than at Foulness; and on the other hand that the benefit in time saved for passengers and freight in travel to and from the airport at Cublington would be some £200 millions greater. The government, to its credit, disregarded the economic advantages of Cublington and declared an intention (since abandoned anyway) to put the airport at Foulness. I said 'to its credit', but that begs a very important question. As a rational deduction from the hard evidence it was not the optimum decision. The creditable thing is that the government took into account certain social values which are not quantifiable; they combined the hard evidence with intuition about these values; they used what is so well expressed by the word 'hunch'.
The Limitations ofRational Analysis
This is what I mean by the human dimension in policy making about the environment. I invite you to reflect on some of its implications. For many political decisions (not only decisions about the environment) there has to be an ingredient of hard data: scientific, technological, economic, statistical. But before the decision can be made, another ingredient has to be added. I called it 'hunch' but a more respectable name for it is 'political judgment'. This can be shallow, as it is when it is mere vote catching; but it can be profound, and sometimes it tips the balance even against the weight of cognitive evidence. This is a fact of life and there are two ways of looking at it. One is to regret it as a deficiency which scientists and social scientists will ultimately overcome, as they are able to quantify more and more social values; computerizing, and putting a money tag on qualities like anxiety, suffering, joy, the beauty of the South Downs without pylons carrying power cables, the voice of the nightingale. Another way of looking at it is to commend it, as an admission that some of the values which mean most to mankind cannot be quantified, that attempts to quantify them distort them and therefore obscure the issues, and that we should expect those who have to make decisions on our behalf to have a flair for combining the cognitive with the non-cognitive, to be persons possessing what Laplace called 'a happy tact given by nature' for making wise decisions. Let us now examine these two contrasted attitudes as they affect the making of decisions to protect the environment.
In the simplest case there is no argument about whether the environment should be protected (from damage, say, due to pollution). The only argument is about how much should be spent on protection. The cost of pollution abatement rises very steeply with the amount of abatement achieved. For example, a study was made in 1969 of the cost of cleaning the air over Kansas City (Table 1) . A similar study was made of the cost of cleaning up the Delaware River estuary, by restoring its very depleted oxygen content ( Table 2) .
The technology for treating air and water is known, and economists can calculate the approximate cost of applying the technology. But (as economists never tire of reminding us) it is not their business to tell us whether to incur the cost and if so how much ought to be spent. It is for them to analyse the logic of choices between options, not to say which choice ought to be made. What they can do (in theory at any rate) is to indicate a principle upon which a choice could be made. The principle is this. If you have the data, you can draw a curve which shows the marginal cost of abating pollution, plotted against the amount of pollution abated. And on the same graph you could (if you had the data) draw another curve which shows the marginal damage done by pollution (also expressed as -cost) plotted Table 2 Cost of improving oxygen content of water in Delaware Estuary (Kneese 1971) Cost ($ million) Annual Capital Untreated 0 0
To attain 2 parts/t10 oxygen 1.6 120 To attain 3-4 parts/1O6 oxygen 7.0 300 against the amount of pollution left in the air or water. At the point where the two curves cross is the optimal level of pollution abatement. Beyond this optimum the damage done by pollution is less than the cost of abating it; below this optimum it is cheaper to abate pollution than to sustain the damage of not abating it.
It is not difficult to get data for the cost of abating pollution by different amounts, but despite heroic efforts, I do not think we have any really credible data for the cost of damage done by pollution. For example, it is known that high levels of sulphur dioxide and particulates in the air increase the incidence of respiratory diseases. A price tag of sorts can be attached to this: medical costs, loss of production due to illness, discounted lost earnings due to premature death; to which can be added costs of metal corrosion, more frequent laundry work, higher consumption of detergents, and an estimate of the value of the leisure time which citizens spend at weekends polishing their cars. This has in fact been done in a mammoth exercise carried out by the Programmes Analysis Unit (1972) . Table 3 shows a sample of their data. Notice that the largest figures here are for subjective social costs and not costs calculated from objective financial data. This is another example of the human dimension. For the Delaware Estuary there are estimates not of damage but of presumed benefits which would follow cleaning up the water. It was worked out that if the oxygen level were lifted to 3-4 parts/106 there might be benefits of millions of dollars arising from the presence of anglers and holiday-makers, hiring rowing boats at the rate of $2.50 per hour, and so on.
Suffice it to say that in my view none of these data for damageor benefitcurves are credible enough to determine a political decision, partly because they include guesses which can so easily be challenged, but mainly for two other reasons:
(1) They take no account of the interests of future Jephcott Lecture generations (a slow accumulation of mercury in a river, for instance, may be doing no damage at present, but circumstances might arise when the accumulated mercury would be a disaster). (2) They put no price tag on the distress of the family whose father is dying of emphysema, nor of the pleasure of looking at clean buildings (as you can when you look east from St James's Park), nor the tranquillity of a quiet forest, nor-in a wordall that is symbolized by Rousseau's nightingale. And so I conclude, as I look at the hard data for decision making about how much to spend on protecting the environment that, while cost-effective studies can be very useful, to indicate the cheapest way to achieve an agreed level of protection of the environment, costbenefit studies have very little use: you cannot with any confidence rely on equations which balance costs of abatement against costs of damage for the lack of abatement. Numerically the equations cannot be solved. But politically they must be solved. So the decision maker has to combine hard data with subjective judgment of values; he has to rank the values in some order of priority and make a decision which he will doubtless rationalize afterwards but which has in it a large component of intuition; something which the poet Robert Bridges described as 'masterful administration of the unforeseen'.
And so we have to ask how broad is the range of uncertainty within which the decision maker has to work? In policy making about the protection of the environment there are three kinds of uncertainty. There can be uncertainty about facts; there can be.uncertainty about what people think about the facts; there can be uncertainty about the future consequences of present decisions. All three affect the human dimension in policies about the environment.
Uncertainty about Facts Consider one example of uncertainty about facts (Department of the Environment 1976). It is agreed by all who have competence in the matter that chlorofluoromethanes (commonly called fluorocarbons), used as propellants in aerosols, persist in the lower atmosphere (the troposphere) and are accumulating there; the present concentration is about one part in 1010. It is known that these substances rise into the stratosphere where they are decomposed, and one effect of the decomposition is to break down ozone some 30-40 km above the earth's surface. There is some evidence that the amount of ozone may already have decreased by 0.6 %. If this continues unchecked there might be a maximum decrease of 8 % in the ozone layer in 100 years' time. It is known, too, that even if fluorocarbons were banned now, the material already released would go on breaking down ozone in the stratosphere for 15 years or more.
Beyond this we. get into areas of speculation. First, since ozone is made in the stratosphere from oxygen which is there, is it being replaced automatically as quickly as it is destroyed? This is something one might expect from the common behaviour of chemical reactions. We do not know, because the amount of ozone in the stratosphere varies considerably, even from day to day, sometimes by as much as 150%, and this masks any long-term effects which might be due to fluorocarbons or emissions from stratospheric flight. Indeed there is still some doubt whether atomic chlorine persists in the stratosphere at all, to do the damage attributed to it. It has recently been suggested that chlorine nitrate (CIONO2) might be formed there; if this were so, two potentially dangerous gases would be immobilized: chlorine and the oxide of nitrogen arising from supersonic aircraft.
Second, would reduction of ozone in the stratosphere (if it does occur) affect life on earth? It has been claimed by the National Academy of Sciences in America that a I% reduction of ozone would allow an increased penetration of ultraviolet which would cause a 20% increase in the incidence of skin cancer. Yet even an 8 % decrease in ozonethe maximum predicted valuewould lead to an increased penetration of ultraviolet equivalent only to that which would occur if one moved from, say, Carlisle to Torquay; and the epidemiology of skin cancer does not seem to show such a rigid and invariable correlation between ultraviolet radiation and the disease.
There might also be effects on agriculture and even climate; but no one pretends to have facts about these possibilities.
A third area of speculation is the economic consequence of any baneven if it were practicable on a world scaleon what is now a gigantic industry. World production in 1950 was about 50 000 tonnes. In 1974 it had reached something like 850 000 tonnes. Exports from Britain in 1974 amounted to some £70 millions and the industry in one way or another gives employment, in Britain alone, to some 50 000 people (and in the United States to over 400 000 people). The industry is, all the same, searching for substitute materials. This is a case where the facts are indeterminate but public pressure is building up to demand that governments take some action; indeed in the State of Oregon fluorocarbons are (I believe) already banned.
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Uncertainty in Public Opinion
This brings me to the second uncertainty: uncertainty about what people think about the facts. In a pluralistic democracy legislators rarely lead public opinion; they have to follow it, or at best anticipate it by a very short head. But there is a subtle two-way influence. Sometimes, as over the disposal of toxic wastes, politicians are driven to act by public opinion. At other times, as over the Health and Safety at Work Act, the politicians try to educate public opinion: laws can be pedagogical as well as proscriptive. So the politician has to try to interpret social norms as well as to influence them; and this is both difficult and capricious.
It is difficult because statistical evidence, which is copiously available for many decisions, omits some of the values which people cherish most and which, therefore, are an essential ingredient of political decisions. A few months ago Harold Wilson, when he was Prime Minister, made a remark which aptly illustrates my point. Having said that the rate of unemployment was about 6 %, he went on to say that for the man who is unemployed, the rate is 100 %. This is one inescapable dilemma of the decision maker who has to interpret statistics. It was Quetelet (quoted by de Jouvenel 1967), one of the founding fathers of statistics, who put the case most crudely. We must (he said) 'lose sight of man considered on his own, and regard him only as a fraction of the species. In stripping him of his individuality, we get rid of all that is accidental . . .' And he went on to say that when this has been done, what is left can be considered in the aggregate, and 'is of the order of physical facts'. For the purposes of statistics, this is sound doctrine; but as a sole guide to political decisions it would be anathema in a pluralistic democracy. All statistical statements about people omit what, for most people, matters most to them, namely their uniquerfess. The whole strategy of policy for the environment must rest on the belief that men are not interchangeable like atoms ofcarbon; their individualities are not, as Quetelet asserted, accidental. The problem, moreover, is to know what people want. A public opinion poll which asked: 'Would you like the Thames in London to be cleaner?' would get a practically unanimous 'yes'. A poll which asked: 'Would you prefer £30 millions to be spent on cleaning up the Thames or on improving schools?' would get a different answer. And a more trustworthy answer might be the one that would be given to the question: 'Are you prepared to pay another 3p on the rates in order to pay for cleaning up the Thames?' But the answer to that would be meaningless unless one knew the income levels and places of residence of the respondents. Even the most highly sophisticated questionnaires are liable to give very capricious information.
So what in fact happens? The decision makers find themselves relying on-the influence of pressure groups and lobbies. They watch the response from the public to the perpetual surges of synthetic publicity from the mass media. Commonly, over environmental matters, the decision makers have to wait until there is an incident of some kind which acts like a shot of adrenaline to the public conscience, and enables them to make a decision which they know will win approval. Thus both politicians and civil servants knew as far back as 1964 that toxic wastes were being tipped in unauthorized places where they might do damage. In that year the Department of Housing and Local Government set up a Committee to look into the problem. It worked in a leisurely way and reported six years later, in 1970. No action was taken. In 1971 the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution took up the matter and pressed the government to bring in legislation. Still no action was taken. In the autumn of that year a shop steward in the Transport and General Workers' Union complained to his employers (who were in the waste disposal business) that some -of his mates were getting a cash bonus for what is called fly-tipping, the dumping of toxic waste secretly in unauthorized places. In December 1971 the scandal broke in the press. By January 1972 there were TV shots of cyanide, drums and other nasty substances in tips all over the place. This raised public opinion to the flashpoint where government action was imperative. The Deposit of Poisonous Wastes Act 1972 was hastily drafted, squeezed into the parliamentary programme, and received the royal assent at the beginning of March.
This sort of incident illustrates, too, the third difficulty which confronts the decision maker when he assesses public opinion. In so far as public opinion is moulded by the mass media there is a fickleness about the way the media take up a cause, give it saturation treatment, and then drop it; not always because the matter has been dealt with, but just because the news commentators are tired of it. Thus from January to March 1972 the media plugged cyanide. By April this had been replaced by the notorious scare about computers simulating doom. By autumn this had evaporated (though the issues raised had not by any means evaporated) and the media were full of anxiety about lead. A few months later the lead scare vanished (though, again, the problem remained) and. its place was taken by sulphur dioxide, followed by the nuisance from works making coalite and carbon black (emphasized by a headline in one of the local papers: 'BABY LOUISE'S NAPPIES' which were blackened on the clothes line before they were dry). Then we had another round on lead, and then fluorocarbons. The mass media are essential agents to excite the public conscience over abuses to the environment; but it is necessary to recognize that they tire of a topic once it has lost its news value, whether the problem has been solved or not. This is not the most perplexing kind of capriciousness. Much more significant and puzzling is the apparently irrational attitude which people have toward environmental hazards (Sinclair et al. 1972 , Kates 1976 . Some 7000 people are killed and some 350 000 injured each year on the roads of Britain. Yet this perpetual carnagenearly 1000 killed or injured every daygenerates no public outrage. People are as reconciled to it as they were to typhus a century and a half ago. Indeed there is resistance to legislative measures which might reduce it, such as a lower speed limit, compulsory seat belts, and built-in safety devices in cars. But if 7 people were to be killed and 350 injured in one day in one incident at one spotone thousandth of the annual number of road casualtiesthere would be an outcry, banner headlines, perhaps a public enquiry and possibly fresh legislation. Comparative statistics are difficult to interpret, but for what they are worth, these are the British fatality rates per 109 passenger-hours: in cars, 570; in buses and railways, 40-less than one-tenth. But there is no rationality about the arithmetic of perception: public reaction to one railway accident is incomparably greater than to ten single car accidents.
Another example of the contrast between the severity of a risk and its impact on the public was the collapse of flats at Ronan Point due to a gas explosion (Ministry of Housing and Local Government 1968 , Pugsley 1969 . Four people were killed and 17 injured. There was an official enquiry and intense public interest and pressure to provide in future (at considerable additional cost) fail-safe designs. The tribunal hazarded the risk level by saying that out of fifty blocks the size of Ronan Point, with a life of sixty years, there was a chance of one explosion such as the one which had occurred. The estimated death risk was thought to be about 5-10 chances per million, compared with a death risk of about 200 chances per million from what are called 'routine' accidents in the home, though many of these accidents in the home are due to faulty design or bad maintenance (Building Research Station 1964) . But although the death risk from 'one-off' accidents in the home is 20-40 times as great the public conscience is not aroused by this risk at all.
We have to distinguish between three measures of attitude to environmental hazards, whether they endanger human life or not: (1) The statistical assessment of a hazardous event occurring (a flood, a depletion of ozone in the stratosphere, a health risk from lead). (2) The public perception of this hazard, which may be quite different, for it is distorted on one hand by overemphasis on propinquity (a flood in East Anglia makes a far greater impact than a flood on the Ganges); by overemphasis on the severity of an individual event (5 people killed in one road accident makes a much greater impactand will be included in a radio news bulletinthan 5 people killed in five different accidents); and on the other hand by an underemphasis of the probabilityoften very lowof the event occurring. (3) The third measure of attitude to environmental hazards is even more subtle: it is the personal evaluation of the risk against the benefits. People will voluntarily accept far greater risks then they will tolerate if the risks are imposed upon them by society. Thus many people reckon that the benefits of smoking cigarettes or riding motor bikes outweigh what they realize is a higher risk of death, particularly if the danger is postponed into what seems to them to be a distant future. Now consider how this applies to policy -making. In a totalitarian state decision makers can disregard both the public perception and the public evaluation of environmental hazards, and base policy solely on the rational assessment (if the data are available) of the probability of a hazard occurring and the severity of its occurrence. But in a pluralistic democracy it is the other two measures: the subjective perception of the hazard and the public risk-benefit impression of it, which the politician has to use for his decision making. Attempts to quantify this are in a very rudimentary state, and public perception of hazards is very sensitive to propaganda from the mass media. But one can (I think) make one tentative generalization (see Fig 1) . The mean overall risk of death per annum from disease (disregarding the effects of age) is about 10-2. The risk of death through natural disasters (floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, snake-bites &c.) is about 10-6 per person per year of exposure. As a very rough generalization it can be said that risks of 10-6 are of no great concern to the average person (though risks of nuclear power plant disasters are thought to be in the region of 10-9). Attitudes to risks of 10-5 take the form of warnings (of parents Kates 1976) to children not to go into deep water or to play with 240-volt electrical equipment). When the risks rise to 10-4 the public are willing to incur expenditure to reduce the risk (e.g. crash barriers on roads, railings at busy intersections), unless the risk is voluntary, e.g. for cigarette smokers. At 10-3 a risk becomes unacceptable to the public and there is strong pressure to have it reduced. The generalization is greatly affected by the benefits which people get (or think they get) from the risk (Kates 1976 ).
It is not only the irrationality of public opinion about environmental hazards which the decision maker has to take into account; he has to take into account certain irrational tendencies in himself which may greatly affect policy. Some interesting work has been done by psychologists on the analysis of choices under risk. Let me illustrate it by an example from two Israeli workers, Kahneman and Tversky, in the form of a gambling puzzle (Kahneman & Tversky 1972 ; see also Kyburk & Smokler 1964) .
You are offered a choice (they say) between £300 for sure, or £700 if a coin to be tossed shows 'heads'; nothing if it shows 'tails'. What is your choice? Most people (they say) choose the first option, and this preference is in itself important: it shows a propensity for 'risk aversion'. In utility theory, it implies that the utility of £300 is more than half the utility of £700, although the ratio of the two sums of money is only 3:7. Now consider another bet. You are offered a choice between a bet which offers you a 4 % chance of getting £300 (with a 96 % chance of not getting it), or a 2% chance of getting £700 (with Oh a 98% chance of not getting it). What is your choice this time? Most people (say Kahneman & Tversky) now prefer the bet which yields the higher stake, even though the odds are lower. This, in utility theory, implies that the utility of £300 is less than half the utility of £700; which is not consistent with the preference shown in the first operation. There is an element of irrationality in the preference. The suggested explanation for this inconsistency has a bearing on the human dimension in my theme; so let me try to explain it. Go back to the first problem. Suppose you choose the 50 % chance of getting £700 if the coin comes down heads, and you lose the bet. You must live with the knowledge that you have incurred a loss of £300 for which you are entirely to blame. Imagine now that you have chosen to take the £300; and then (just to see what happens) you toss the coin and it does come down heads. You surely have a feeling of regret that you have lost £400, but (and this is what is important) the coin is partly 'responsible'; at any rate you have a slightly diminished sense of responsibility for the loss, for it is shared with the coin; and (this is the next important point) this slight easing of responsibility is associated with a reduced sense of regret. In the second problem, by contrast, the responsibility is not wholly yours in either choice (the 4% chance of getting £300 or the 2 % chance of getting £700). In each case external factors 'share the responsibility'. So there is little difference between the amount of anticipated regret which goes with the two gambles; for this reason many people, who will not take the risk when (as in the first problem) they could avoid it, are in the second problem prepared to take the risk.
The lesson to be learnt from this fable is that even in a straight money decision, other subtle psychological factors influence the decision, which psychologists call risk avoidance and regret avoidance. It is not only in money bets that these factors operate: Kahneman & Tversky point out that they raise 'profound problems in the area of public decision making' (Kahneman 1974) . Noone can object if a man allows risk avoidance and regret avoidance to distort his own personal decisions, but it is another matter when he is making decisions on behalf of other people. Kahneman & Tversky suggest that this same instinct, to favour the decision which minimizes a sense of regret at an unfavourable outcome, and to lighten responsibility by spreading the load, does influence public decision making.
We seem to have strayed from the human dimension in the protection of the environment, but I believe that this digression is relevant to decision making in this area, for two particular reasons. First, the decisions are likely to benefit some people at the expense of others. To restrict the disposal of wastes, to choose a site' for a reservoir or an airfield, to giveor to withholdplanning permission for mining: all these are acts which make enemies. Neither politicians nor the civil servants advising them like making enemies; their temptation to indulge in regret avoidance is strong. It is on this account that much legislation to protect the environment is weakened by compromises. Sometimes the compromises appear as escape clauses (domestic fires were exempted from smoke abatement acts until 1955, although there had been devices to abate smoke from domestic fires for at least 75 years). Sometimes the compromises appear as secrecy clauses. The most outrageous example of these was in the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1961. Clause 12 of this Act made it an offence, punishable by £100 fine or 3 months imprisonment or both, for an official of a River Authority to disclose what pollutants were being put into a river, though to pollute the river without a consent made the polluter liable to a fine which might be as trivial as £25. Second, the decisions about the environment are likely to have very long-term effects and this predisposes the decision maker to cover himself against what may be totally unforeseen consequences, to take as much risk avoidance as he can get away with.
Uncertainty about Future Consequences The decision maker, I suggested, has to deal with three kinds of uncertainties: of facts (scientific or economic), of public reaction to facts, and of the future consequences of his decisions. Despite a great deal of research on the application of probability theory to decision making under conditions of uncertainty, it is pretty evident that an unquantifiedand perhaps unquantifiablehuman dimension predominates in decisions about all these uncertainties. It is a subjective judgment, which I believe cannot be quantified, when you decide that you cannot wait for any more facts before making a diagnosis, or issuing a regulation. It is a subjective judgment when you allow the public perception of an environmental hazard to influence your decision in a way inconsistent with your knowledge of the statistical and rational assessment of the same hazard. It is a subjective judgment if you decide to go ahead of public opinion and require the public to forgo some benefit now for the sake of posterity. And I now turn to this last question: what weight is to be given to the interests of posterity?
It was Edmund Burke who wrote: 'The public interest requires doing today those things that men of intelligence and goodwill would wish, five or ten years hence, had been done.' There is an astringent realism about this. In the context of the 1970s the words I would want to emphasize are 'five or ten years' -not 50 or 100 years. Burke was speaking in the eighteenth century, when the rate of change was at a glacial speed compared with the rate today. He might have been excused for assuming that social values would not change much even 50 to 100 years ahead of his time. Today it would be a lunatic assumption; and this is the dilemma of those who try to peer into the future of society. There is an embarrassing contrast between the reliability of prediction in the physical sciences and its unreliability in the social sciences. We can already say, with a probability which amounts almost to certainty, exactly where the planets will be on 14 July 2076. We cannot say, with a probability which carries any conviction at all, what the Times Financial Index will be even on 14 July 1977, or what the social norms about clean air and water will be at the next turn of the century. Hence the futility, in my view, of most scenarios for the year 2000, except possibly those written by novelists. It is of course reprehensible for a politician to make a decision about the environment based only on expediency and not principle, with an eye only on the next election. But there are dangers, too, in taking the very long-term view. The further you get beyond Burke's horizon, the scantier are the hard data and the more likely are your guesses about future social values to be falsified. It follows that arguments for making a decision about an environmental problem which will not 'mature', as it were, for a century, are inevitably difficult to defend and unlikely to lead to any practical action. It is very difficult to persuade human communities to adapt themselves in anticipation of a hazard which has not yet materialized. Utopias end up in wastepaper baskets. So my rule of thumb in environmental policy making would be to follow Edmund Burke's advice: to make a decade rather than a century the horizon for most decision making. But let me say in the same breath that this does not mean sacrificing principle for expediency; just the opposite: it means recognition that the choices we make influence the values we come to hold. There is plenty of historical evidence that this happens: witness the immense change in social values about the environment over the last 100 years. So each and every limited decision about the environment contributes to the evolution of an environmental ethic. The environmental ethic is not a fixed goal, an immutable concept: it is an evolving idea. Like other kinds of evolution, we do not know where it is going; but provisional principles do gradually emerge. I think I can dimly see a principle emerging now, though what its consequences will be is not at all clear.
Darwin, in the 'Descent of Man', observes that the history of man's moral development has been a continual enlargement of the objects of his social instincts and sympathies. Darwin's greatest message to humanity was that nature is not (as the anthropocentric Judcko-Christian tradition implies) something separate from man, inferior to him, to be exploited by him with impunity. Modern ecology puts man in his place as one unitan alarmingly powerful onein a grand symbiosis along with animals, plants, bacteria, plankton. ('We fat all creatures else to fat us, and we fat ourselves for maggots' -Hamlet.) Except when analysed into little fragments, the symbiosis is beyond our comprehension; but we do know enough about it now to suspect that any act which puts at risk the equilibria in nature may be dangerous, even to ourselves. And this in turn has awakened the public conscience to a certain responsibility towards animals and plants, regarding them, in a sense, as having rights. I do not mean this in any sentimental or mystical sense. It is commonly supposed that only people have rights in law. This is not correct.
Corporations, trusts, societies, universities, all have rights in law, though since they are inanimate, people act on their behalf as their 'guardians'. Already the law protects some animals against ill treatment, and we are witnessing now (as Darwin predicted) a very encouraging extension of man's 'social instincts and sympathies' which is evident in the man-made laws which confer certain restricted rights upon animals and even upon plants.
Take two recent examples. A few months ago the royal assent was given to the Conservation of Wild Creatures and Wild Plants Act which makes it an offence to kill, injure, or to take or have in your possession 6 species of wild creatures and 22 species of wild plants, all of which are so rare that most of us have never seen any of them. (Among the animals are the mouse-eared bat and natterjack toad.) Going through Parliament now is the Endangered Species Bill which-restricts the import or export of another, much longer, list of organisms, including even some molluscs and insects. Of course some laws to protect creatures (the close seasons for fish and game, for example) are frankly to indulge the whims of man. Both these recent laws seem to me to be truly altruistic, not anthropocentric. They are examples of a politics of values, not just of interests.
By the designation of certain places as nature reserves or areas of natural beauty, the government extends some protection beyond individual species to whole communities of organisms including (though they are not specified) insects JephcottLecture and soil bacteria. The most interesting development of this attitude to nature is to be found in the United States. There, much more than in Britain, disputes about the protection of the environment are dealt with in the law courts.
When there is a threat to the environment, public interest groups, notably the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), with lawyers willing to help them at reduced fees or for no fee at all, act as guardians would for a child who is threatened, defending its interests in court. The difficulty hitherto has been that the interest group has had to prove that its members are personally affected by the threat to the environment. This may be good law, but it is bad biology, because it leaves to the government (which has plenty of more important things to think about) or to nobody at all, the responsibility for protecting those parts of the environment which do not happen to be benefiting some person or group of persons. But a change is on the horizon. Four years ago, in the United States Supreme Court, three out of seven judges entered a dissenting opinion which may be a landmark in the history of the human dimension in the protection of the environment (Supreme Court of the United States 1972; see also Stone 1974) . The case was about a remote wilderness called Mineral King Valley, in California. Walt Disney Enterprises Ltd wanted to establish there a complex of motels, restaurants and recreational facilities at a cost of $35 million. The Sierra Club challenged the project and it went in the end to the Supreme Court. By a majority of one the Sierra Club (and hence the valley) lost the case. But the dissenting opinion is certain to be pressed in other courts. It concerns the question whether natural objectsa woodland, a marsh, a stretch of moorlandshould have standing in the courts. Part of the dissenting opinion by Mr Justice Douglas is as follows: 'The critical question of "standing" would be simplified ... if we fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be dispoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage. Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation.' I think I can discern here a practical machinery by which the decision maker on environmental policy can adopt a principle when he is legislating not only for the present but for posterity. He will, of course, have to continue to use 'hunch' in his decisions; but so does his colleague in other government departments, making decisions on foreign policy or VAT or the health service. But 'hunch' based on principle is more likely to be consistent. The principle itself is simply Darwin's demonstration that man is an integral part of the grand symbiotic system, and that (to adapt Donne) 'any tree's death diminishes me'. This has to be reconciled with the necessity that nature must be exploited for the needs of society; ores must be dug out of the earth, wastes must be discharged, monocultures of crops must replace natural vegetation. So we need a social device for achieving this reconciliation. One possibility would be for interest groups (bodies like the Friends of the Earth) to challenge in the courts or at public enquiries proposals which might damage the environment or to comment on draft laws and regulations for protecting the environment. Something like this already happens over applications for planning permission, so what I am suggesting would be a refinement and extension of an adversary procedure already familiar to us in Britain, with two important and essential conditions: (l) that both sides in the adversary encounter must have access to similar information and technical expertise; and (2) that the encounter must be conducted in a formal and rational way: as in scientific discussion or in courts of law. The interest groups, in acting as guardians for the environment, would automatically be working in the interests of posterity too; and the decision maker (upon whom, of course, the final verdict has to depend) could, from this evidence, assess more reliably the possible effects of his decision upon posterity. That, you remember, is the third of the three uncertainties which confront the decision maker.
But I repeat that there are two prerequisites for the effective operation of an environmental impact assessment. First, the public (or, to be precise, the lobbies which try to mould and to express the public conscience) must be adequately educated to understand the issues andsomething hitherto denied themtheymust haveaccess to the facts. I suppose that all I have said could be summed up in four assertions: (1) Decisions on the protection of the environment are not just deductions from scientific and technical and economic data; there is an important, and sometimes a decisive, contribution based on 'fragile' social values whichin my viewcannot be quantified without draining them of their content. That is one aspect of the human dimension.
(2) It is very difficult to assess these social values because public perception of an environmental hazard does not coincide with the expert's prediction of the probability of its occurrence and the damage it may do; there is a depressingly low correlation between the validity of peoples' 729 730 Proc. roy. Soc. Med. Volume 69 October 1976 opinions and the confidence with which they are held.
(3) The decision maker himself is liable to have an instinctive bias to risk aversion and dilution of responsibility, and this may cause him to make decisions which are not of optimum utility in the public interest. (4) The decision maker may find himself having to resolve a conflict of interests between the present and posterity. There seem to be'only two practicable techniques to deal with this last problem. One is to break the big judgments down into little step-wise judgments, all consistent with some principle; the other is to increase the number of judges. This is the justification for encouraging public interest groups to engage in an adversary process similar to that now used in public planning enquiries: the public interest groups could be regarded as acting in the interests of posterity, as guardians of the 'rights' of natural objects. I know that the theme of this lecture is a familiar and self-evident one. If the lecture has a moral, it is that what is familiar and self-evident may nevertheless be imperfectly understood. There is a long and complex chain reaction between a ministerial decision in the Department of the Environment and Rousseau's nightingale.
